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Abstract.  We study the introduction of new technologies when their costs are subject to 
idiosyncratic uncertainty and can only be fully learned through individual experience.  We set up a 
dynamic model of clean experience goods that replace old polluting consumption options and show 
how optimal regulation evolves over time.  In our base setting where social and private learning 
incentives coincide, the optimal tax on the polluting consumption is increasing over time.  We 
show, however, that if social and private learning incentives diverge because the private discount 
rate exceeds the social discount rate, it may be optimal to temporarily increase the tax rate beyond 
net marginal external damages to induce more learning before reducing the tax rate to the steady-
state level.  Alternatively, one could complement the tax with subsidies for first-time users which 
can be phased out over time.  Similar results apply if consumers have biased expectations.  We 
therefore give a rationale for introductory subsidies on new, clean technologies and non-monotonic 
tax paths from a perspective of consumer learning.   
JEL: D82, L51, H21, H23, Q52, Q55 
Keywords: experience goods, dynamic regulation, learning by doing, new technology, 
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1.  Introduction 
Many environmental regulation schemes involve taxes or subsidies that change over time.  In 
this paper, we study the dynamics of environmental regulation to control the adoption of a socially 
beneficial experience good.  That is, by trying out a new, less polluting consumption choice, 
consumers may learn the personal net costs they incur from its use, i.e. their personal abatement 
costs.   
Examples are widespread: Car users are often only partially informed about the specific costs 
and benefits of using public transport (or other means of transportation).  Ecologically produced 
food and clothing may have attributes unknown to the inexperienced user, including taste, 
durability, social acceptance and the like.  Household or office appliances are often advertised in 
terms of their higher energy efficiency relative to the older versions they seek to replace, but 
consumers only have limited knowledge about the operating costs and convenience associated with 
these new products.  Learning by experience can also be linked to motivational factors such as the 
warm-glow effect or social reputation derived from using environmentally friendly products 
(Andreoni 1990, Benabou and Tirole 2006).  These examples share two features: that the new 
product reduces an externality and that consumers are uncertain about their personal benefits and 
costs before trying out the new product.   
We study the optimal regulation of an experience good, explore rationales for initial subsidies 
for a new product, and demonstrate how optimal regulation levels change over time.  We focus on 
the dynamics of a government intervention that is driven exclusively by consumers learning the net 
costs that they personally incur from adopting a new technology (hereafter denominated ‘learning’).  
That is, we abstract from learning spillovers among consumers as well as from supply-side 
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arguments such as cost reductions through an intensified use of the new technology caused by 
technological spillovers among firms.   
The study of experience goods is novel in the environmental economics domain.  Our paper is, 
however, related to studies in industrial organization that focus on the supply of experience goods 
under imperfect competition.  Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) examine monopolistic pricing of 
experience goods in a dynamic model.  They show that price dynamics crucially depend on a 
simple dichotomy between mass and niche markets.1 While prices in mass markets are declining 
over time, they may initially be low but subsequently increase in niche markets.  The low initial 
prices are set with a policy focus aimed at increasing market penetration, whereas the higher prices 
in the steady state (where no more learning takes place) maximize monopoly profits.  The literature 
on dynamic pricing of experience goods goes back to Shapiro (1983) who considers learning in a 
simple two-period model.  The pricing of experience goods has also been discussed by Cremer 
(1984), Farrell (1986), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).   
We set up a dynamic model of a new experience good that replaces a preexisting consumption 
choice which generates an environmental externality.  We consider an infinite-horizon, discrete-
time model with a continuum of consumers, who have (at most) unit demand per period for the 
new product.  Alternatively, they consume the traditional, more polluting product.  Consumers 
differ in their expected net costs of using the new technology and face an ex-ante unknown cost 
                                                 
1 In their paper, a mass market is characterized by the optimal price for informed consumers being low enough that 
uninformed consumers have an incentive to try the new product.  In such a market, all consumers will eventually try 
the new product.  Conversely, a niche market will feature consumers who do not try the new product, as they have no 
incentive to do so at the optimal price for informed consumers.   
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component.  The latter is subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty and can only be learned through 
individual experience.  We assume that consumers only learn their true costs, i.e. their valuation 
relative to the old technology, once they have used the new technology for one time period.2   
We consider two different regulatory regimes: We start by analyzing the first-best case in 
which the regulator, at each point in time, determines both the number of inexperienced consumers 
who are exposed to the new technology for the first time, and the set of experienced consumers 
whose continued use of the technology is optimal.  Second, we consider a setting where the 
regulator needs to rely solely on subsidies or taxes.  The subsidy in the given period then 
determines both the behavior of the experienced consumers as well as the inexperienced consumers’ 
decision to try the new technology.   
We show how optimal regulation evolves over time.  As long as consumers’ and social 
discount rates coincide and expectations about the net costs of the new technology are unbiased, 
the first-best case can be decentralized by simply relying on a corrective tax levied on the polluting 
technology, with the optimal tax rate increasing over time.  If the private discount rate exceeds the 
social discount rate or if consumers’ cost expectations are biased, the tax alone does not suffice.  
The first-best solution can then be implemented by complementing the tax with a subsidy for first-
time users.  This subsidy will be non-increasing over time.  If the regulator cannot discriminate 
between first-time and experienced users, the second-best taxation scheme may involve a non-
                                                 
2 This is a stylized assumption.  In general, learning takes places at different rates, and consumers may have different 
levels of initial knowledge about the new technology.  Empirical evidence suggests that the rate of learning crucially 
depends on the market (e.g., Erdem and Keane (1996), Ackerberg (2003), Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003), Israel 
(2005), Crawford and Shum (2005), and Goettler and Clay (2006)).   
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monotonic path: Tax rates are initially increasing with a policy focused on reaching the optimal 
amount of knowledge (i.e. the number of consumers that have learned their net personal costs), 
before being reduced to the level that reflects the marginal social costs of using the polluting 
alternative.   
Our results are qualitatively similar to those derived by Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) in the 
context of the optimal monopoly pricing of experience goods.  During the approach path, the 
government (or monopolist) sets the tax with a focus on inducing optimal learning.  In the steady 
state, however, no more learning takes place, and the tax (price) is chosen so as to maximize social 
welfare (monopoly profits).   
We believe that our results indicate an important reason for a slow introduction of pollution 
taxes that is motivated by the fact that consumers are uncertain about their personal costs or 
benefits from using a new and cleaner technology.  Only by trying it will they learn about the 
personal fit.  We show that such a setting not only motivates taxes that are increasing over time, 
but that it may also require introductory subsidies for first-time users that are phased out over time.   
Our paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents our basic model, and Section 3 discusses 
the social optimum.  Section 4 considers the case of first-best regulation, while we turn to a 
second-best regulation that solely relies on usage taxes in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes.   
2.  Base model 
Consumers choose one of two mutually exclusive alternatives, which we will label A and B.  
Alternative A is the status quo and all of its costs and benefits are known, including environmental 
externalities (example: commuting by car).  Alternative B is characterized entirely by private costs 
(example: commuting by train).  For simplicity, we assume that alternative B does not have 
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external costs or benefits, and that alternative A does not generate private costs.3  Consumers who 
have never used alternative B are uncertain about the total private costs and benefits involved, 
which vary by individual: In other words, they do not know the true opportunity costs of adopting 
the new technology.  Once a consumer tries B for one period, he learns his true net costs (or 
equivalently, his overall utility).  If these net costs are below those associated with alternative A, 
the consumer will continue using alternative B; otherwise he will revert to alternative A.4  
Consumers ignore environmental externalities when choosing between A and B.   
We separate the private net costs to the consumer into an ‘unknown’ part prior to trying 
alternative B, and an ‘ex ante known’ part.  This allows for the possibility that consumers have 
some information about some costs, even if they are unsure about the total costs.   
We will denote a consumer’s ex-ante known costs as S∆∆∈ , which are distributed within the 
population according to the pdf ( )g ∆  and cdf ( )G ∆  defined over an interval S∆ .  In addition, each 
consumer faces a cost component Sδδ ∈  that is unknown before experiencing the good.  We 
denote the pdf and cdf of δ  over the interval Sδ  by ( )f δ  and ( )F δ , respectively.  We assume 
                                                 
3 This assumption conveys no loss of generality as long as the marginal costs of B are larger than those of A, even for 
the first user who switches from A to B.  The same logic applies to environmental damages.   
4 Key to our model is the reversibility of the decision.  For our example of car commuting vs. public transportation, 
this means that consumers would keep their car when trying the public transport option rather than selling it 
immediately.  Other examples could include renting zero-energy housing or using electric cars.  Again, the key 
assumption is that the decision is reversible without additional costs, that the new technology is costlier than the old 
one, and that switching from the old to the new technology reduces an externality.   
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that ∆  and δ  are distributed independently of each other and have full support.  Consumers are 
thus defined over a type-space S Sδ∆Θ ≡ + .   
Private net costs are given by θ δ≡ ∆ + .  We normalize [ ] 0E δ =  such that a consumer’s type 
can be characterized by his /her (male form used hereafter for simplicity) ex-ante expected costs 
[ | ] [ | ]E Eθ δ∆ = ∆ + ∆ = ∆ .   
Every period, a fraction of consumers try alternative B for the first time.  The distribution of ∆  
defines the sequence according to which consumers try alternative B, with the first consumers to 
learn having the lowest expected costs ∆ .  This means that we can express the fraction of 
consumers who have learned at any given time as ( )tG ∆ , where t∆  refers to the threshold in 
expected private costs below which all consumers have learned at time t.   
We denote tθ  as the threshold for private net costs up to which informed consumers continue 
to use alternative B at time t .  A consumer who has already learned his private net costs by trying 
alternative B chooses to use B if, and only if, tθ θ≤ .  Let [0,1]tΩ ∈  describe the fraction of 
consumers who use B at time t.  Normalizing the mass of consumers to 1, we obtain 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
t t t tF dG G Gθ
∆
+
−∞
Ω ≡ −∆ ∆ + ∆ − ∆∫       (1) 
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where the first term describes the fraction of informed consumers who choose B over A at any 
given time t, and 1( ) ( )t tG G+∆ − ∆  is the fraction of consumers who learn in period t.
5   
The use of the dirty alternative A generates external damages (1 )tD D= −Ω  (with ' 0D > , 
'' 0D ≥ ).  The clean alternative B causes operating costs that depend on the number of users, 
( )tC C= Ω  (with ' 0, '' 0C C> ≥ ).  We assume that in any period, the usage rate of alternative B is 
capacity-constrained: t t tK kΩ ≤ +  where tK  denotes the existing capacity from the previous 
period and tk , its expansion in period t.  Expanding the capacity (or quantity) of alternative B in 
period t to 1t t t tK K k K+ = + ≥  generates costs ( )tQ k  (with ' 0, '(0) 0, '' 0Q Q Q≥ = > ).  A natural 
example for our study is that of building infrastructure; e.g., for a public transportation network.  
Such networks are costly to build and usually entail a slow process such that costs per period are 
highly convex.   
3.  The social optimum 
We set up a dynamic optimization problem from the point of view of the social planner who 
aims to minimize costs (which is equivalent to maximizing social welfare under a utilitarian social 
welfare function).  Defining the per-period increment in the fraction of informed consumers as 
1t t ts += ∆ −∆  and substituting this into the objective function, the intertemporal optimization 
problem can be written as minimizing social costs (SC) by choosing the control variables ,t tsθ  and 
                                                 
5 Since the threshold tθ  can change over time, a consumer could potentially switch back and forth between the two 
alternatives.   
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tk  at every point in time, subject to state equations for the state of knowledge and the available 
capacity, a capacity constraint, nonnegativity constraints, and initial conditions for the state of 
learning and capacity:  
1
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The first term in SC measures the net costs of informed consumers who choose alternative B in 
period t, the second term reflects the expected per-period costs of learning, and the last three terms 
refer to net environmental damages, net costs of the clean alternative and the costs of capacity 
expansions, respectively.  For each period, the social planner determines the cost cutoff value tθ  
for informed consumers, the rate of first-time users ts , and the capacity extension tk .
6  The 
Bellman equation corresponding to (2) is  
                                                 
6 The per-period capacity extension tk  and the state of capacity tK  depend on the choice of tθ  and ts  over time and 
could be substituted out, reducing the problem to one with two control variables.  Specifically, 
1max( ,0)t t tk −= Ω −Ω .  We chose to leave tk  in the model, because it facilitates exposition.   
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subject to the capacity and nonnegativity constraints and initial conditions from (2), leading to a 
Lagrangian of the form  
( ), ( )t t t t t tL J K K kλ= ∆ − + −Ω         (4) 
Dropping the function arguments for damages D , operating costs C , and expansion costs Q  
(but adding a subscript to clarify that the arguments of these functions change over time), the 
optimality conditions are: 
( ) 0 ; 0t t t t tD C λ θ θ′ ′− − − ≥ ≥    (5) 
[ ] 1 11 1
( , )( ) · ( ) 0 ; 0r t tt t t t t t
J KD C g e sλ − + ++ +
∂ ∆′ ′∆ − − − ∆ + ≥ ≥
∂∆
   (6) 
1 1( , ) 0 ; 0r t tt t t
J KQ e k
K
λ − + +
∆′ − + ≥ ≥
∂    (7) 
0 ; 0t t t tK k λ+ −Ω ≥ ≥    (8) 
with complementary slackness holding everywhere.  A solution to the Bellman equation is a 
sufficient condition for optimality.  Equation (5) implies that along the optimum approach path as 
well as in the steady state, marginal private costs tθ  associated with alternative B must be equal to 
marginal net benefits ( ' ' )t t tD C λ− −  of using this alternative, where tλ  adjusts for the current-
period value of a marginal capacity expansion.  Equation (6) equates the net social costs of 
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subjecting the marginal uninformed consumer (the consumer with 1t+∆ = ∆ ) to learning in period t, 
(consisting of the marginal expected cost of using this alternative 1t+∆  less the marginal reduction 
in damages) to the discounted marginal social value of having an additional informed consumer in 
the next period.  If learning is not constrained by current capacity such that t tK > Ω , marginal 
capacity expansion has no value, in which case (8) implies that 0tλ = .  For 0tλ > , equation (7) 
states that marginal expansion costs tQ′  have to be equal to the current-period marginal value of 
expansion tλ  plus the discounted marginal social value of having a larger capacity in the next 
period.   
The intertemporal arbitrage conditions are given by  
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We can use these equations to explore the dynamics of the optimal approach path by means of 
a phase diagram that relates the fraction of informed consumers t∆  to the cost cutoff tθ  in any 
given period.  Because an interior first-best solution features a monotonic approach path for all 
variables, conditions (5)-(8) hold with equality during the approach path as well as in the steady 
state.  This property can be used to combine Eqs. (6)-(10) (derivation in Appendix) to get 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 ( )
t t
r r
t t t t t te e dF
θ
θ θ θ θ δ δ
−∆
−
−∞
− = − −∆ + −∆ −∫     (11) 
12 
1
r
t t tQ e Qλ
−
+′ ′= −           (12) 
A steady state is given by (5), (11) and (12) with 0t ts k= =  and 1t tθ θ −= .
7  To analyze the 
solution in ( , )t tθ∆ -space, we derive the equation of motion for t∆  by setting 0ts =  in (5)
8  while 
holding tλ  constant,
9 and the equation of motion for tθ  by setting 1t tθ θ −=  in (11).   
Starting with the former, we obtain an implicit relationship between tθ  and t∆ , which we 
denominate ( )tθ ∆ , and which can be shown to be decreasing (see Appendix):  
0;
( ) ( '' '') ( ) ( )( ) ( ); 0
1 ( '' '') ( ) ( )tt t
t t t t
t t ts
t t
d D C F g
d D C f dG
λ λ
θ θ
θ θ
θ
∆= =
−∞
∆ − + −∆ ∆
∆ ≡ ∆ = <
∆ + + −∆ ∆∫

   (13) 
The economic interpretation of (13) is as follows:  When no more learning takes place, the 
presence of more informed agents leads to a higher usage rate of the clean technology, ceteris 
paribus, and thus to lower marginal social costs.  But this means that the cutoff value tθ  that fully 
                                                 
7 For [0] 0Q′ = , Eq. (12) implies that 0tλ =  for 1 0t tk k += = .  But with no learning and no change in the cost 
threshold, the same number of users will continue to use alternative B in the following period such that no capacity 
expansion is necessary.  With a monotonic approach path, it follows that 1 0tk + =  if 0t ts k= =  and 1 0t tθ θ += = .   
8 The learning rate ts  appears in the usage rate tΩ  as defined in Eq. (1), which consists of informed users and new 
users (“learners”).  Setting 0ts =  implies that usage of the clean alternative is restricted to informed users.   
9 A completely rigorous treatment would leave tλ  free and result in a 3-dimensional phase diagram.  However, we 
know that 0tλ =  in the steady state such that the third dimension would needlessly complicate the exposition.   
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internalizes external costs (for any given value of tλ ) will be lower.  Conversely, if fewer people 
have learned, usage of the clean technology will decrease, and a higher tθ  is needed to ensure that 
(5) holds.   
Setting 1t tθ θ −=  in equation (11) and solving for tθ  leads to another relationship between 
cutoff costs and the state of knowledge, which we denote by ˆ( )tθ ∆ .  This equality can be 
interpreted as the threshold of social marginal costs tθ  of using the old technology at which 
consumers, up to ex-ante expected costs of t∆ , should optimally learn.  Intuitively, we obtain an 
increasing relationship between t∆  and tθ  (see Appendix):  
1
ˆ( )ˆ( ) ( ); 1
t t
t
t t t
t
d
dθ θ
θ
θ θ
−=
∆
∆ ≡ ∆ =
∆
       (14) 
The difference  t tθ∆ −  can be interpreted as the value of learning for a consumer with ex-ante 
expected costs t∆  when regulation remains constant at tθ .  It is constant in t∆  due to our 
specification that a consumer’s ex-post costs are given by θ δ= ∆ + .   
The two relationships are shown graphically in Figure 1.  The steady state is defined by the 
intersection of the lines defined by ˆ( )θ ∆  and ( )θ ∆ , where no learning takes place and tθ  remains 
constant.  Substituting (1) into (5) implies that for ( )t tθ θ< ∆ , learning will be positive ( 0ts > ) 
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such that the system moves to the right below ( )tθ ∆ , and to the left above.
10  From (11), we see 
that 1t tθ θ −>  if ˆ( )t tθ θ> ∆  and vice versa.  These dynamics are illustrated by the arrows in the 
figure.  As a consequence, the optimal path to the steady state is characterized by cutoff costs tθ  
that increase over time and, naturally, by increasing t∆  with consumers with the smallest expected 
costs trying the new technology first.  The capacity of the systems tK  increases simultaneously.  
The dashed line in Figure 1 illustrates an example of a path to the steady state.  For the first-best 
solution, we can summarize this result as follows: 
Proposition 1 
In the first-best transition path to the steady state, the marginal expected cost of participation 
(1 ) '( )t t t tD Cθ λ′= −Ω − Ω −  increases over time.   
This result may be surprising at first glance: One might expect that as consumers learn, more 
people use the new technology such that net marginal damages t tD C′ ′−  decrease over time (recall 
that t tD C′ ′−  is declining in the usage rate tΩ ).  Proposition 1 implies that this is only the case if the 
marginal value of capacity expansion declines by even more.  With sufficiently low expansion 
costs, ( )tλ−  will increase by less than tθ , such that t tD C′ ′−  will increase too, implying a declining 
                                                 
10 This latter point applies more generally, but since we do not allow for “unlearning” in our model, a disequilibrium 
above the ( )tθ ∆ -line would have to be adjusted by lowering tθ  instead.  Note also that due to the nonnegativity 
condition on learning, the initial state of learning 0∆  must be below the steady state in order for this solution to hold.  
For a higher initial state of learning, no additional learning should take place.  Similarly, the initial capacity 0K  has to 
be below steady-state capacity in order for the capacity constraint to be binding.   
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usage rate.  This rather counterintuitive result for a new technology can be explained as follows: If 
capacity expansion is free or very cheap such that the shadow value of capacity is at or near zero in 
the beginning (recall that it is always zero in the steady state), it will be optimal for consumers to 
learn early on, because this enables them to take advantage of the new technology should their 
idiosyncratic costs turn out to be low enough ( tδ θ∆ + ≤ ).  Increasing net environmental costs 
t tD C′ ′−  therefore imply that the increase in informed users due to an increase in tθ  is over-
compensated by the decline in first-time users.11  Note also that a declining usage rate implies that 
too much capacity is being built, which cannot be optimal if expansion is costly.   
Next, we examine how the steady state depends on the underlying parameters of the model.  
The relationship ˆ( )tθ ∆  depends on the distribution of ( )f δ  (and on whether consumers form 
unbiased expectations of personal costs θ δ= ∆ + , a point to which we return below).  It further 
increases in r , which is a measure of consumers’ (im)patience: Higher discounting implies a larger 
marginal cost threshold to make learning worthwhile for the same agent, ceteris paribus.  With an 
increase in r, the steady state moves up the ( )tθ ∆ -line leading to a higher 
SSθ , combined with a 
smaller steady-state SS∆ .  This effect is shown in Figure 2 as a move from 0ˆ ( )tθ ∆  to 1ˆ( )tθ ∆ , leading 
to a new steady state SS ′ .   
                                                 
11 This follows from the definition of tΩ : If t tD C′ ′−  increases, tΩ  has to decrease.  But with increasing tθ  and t∆ , 
usage by informed consumers (the first part in Eq. (1)) has to increase, such that the reason for the decline in the usage 
rate has to be a decrease in new users (the second part in (1)).   
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The function ( )tθ ∆  increases with marginal social damages t tD C′ ′− .  A more polluting original 
technology (or equivalently, a cleaner new technology) increases the social value of learning such 
that 0 ( )tθ ∆  is shifted to 1( )tθ ∆  and the steady state moves up along the 0ˆ ( )tθ ∆  line to SS ′′ , which 
is associated with both a higher state of knowledge as well as a higher SSθ .   
We illustrate our result numerically, using the following functional forms:  The uniform 
distribution with support [-0.5, 0.5] for ( )f ⋅ ; the uniform distribution with support [0.5, 1.5] for 
( )g ⋅ ;12 2(1 ) ( / 2) (1 )t tD α−Ω = ⋅ −Ω  and 
2( ) ( / 2)t tC βΩ = ⋅Ω , and 
2( ) ( / 2)t tQ k kγ= ⋅ .   
Figure 3 shows the time paths of tθ , t∆ , ts , Kt, tk  and tΩ  for various choices of γ , with α , 
β  and r held constant (the qualitative nature of the paths is stable across these parameter values).  
The cost threshold tθ , the state of knowledge 0.5t∆ −  and total capacity tK  increase, whereas the 
rate of capacity expansion tk  decreases over time.  The participation rate tΩ  decreases over time if 
capacity expansion is cheap (γ  at or close to zero), because the decrease in an initially very high 
rate of learning overcompensates the increase in informed users.  The higher the expansion costs, 
                                                 
12 The rationale for these choices is primarily tractability.  With the uniform distribution of unit support,
( ) ( ) 1f gδ = ∆ = , such that ( )dF dδ δ=  and ( )dG d∆ = ∆ .  The choice of ( )f δ  further ensures that
[ ] 0E δ = .  We set the lower limit of ( )g ∆  to 0.5 in order to avoid negative tax rates.  The fraction of informed 
consumers at any moment is given by ( ) 0.5t tG ∆ = ∆ − .   
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the slower are the increases of in tθ , t∆  and tΩ .  The rate of learning ts  monotonically decreases 
with low expansion costs, but is inversely U-shaped with medium to high costs.13   
4.  Optimal policy choices 
We now address the question of how this optimal transition path can be decentralized by price 
instruments.  For this, we consider a tax (price) tτ  on using the dirty alternative in period t  as well 
as a subsidy14 tσ  for first-time users of the clean alternative; i.e., those consumers who learn about 
their privately-known net costs in period t .      
Consumers choose if and when they wish to learn (i.e., to try the clean alternative for the first 
time), based on their private known costs ∆ , their expected unknown costs δ , and the prevailing 
tax and subsidy rates.  Conditional on the policy-path ( , )t tτ σ  and their private rate of discount Pr , 
                                                 
13 The intuition behind the nonlinear shape is as follows: Suppose that expansion is costly such that only a small 
fraction of consumers should learn in the first period.  Due to the low cutoff value, most of these first-period learners 
will revert to the old technology, leaving room for more learning using the capacity built in the first period.  Together 
with the capacity added in period 2, the resulting state of knowledge will be higher in the second period than in the first.  
As tθ  increases, the fraction of experienced to first-time users will also increase, slowing the increase in learning and 
eventually leading to a falling ts .   
14 Theoretically, the subsidy could be negative; i.e., a tax.  Both types of subsidy correct for a learning inefficiency:  If 
consumers are reluctant to learn (meaning that Pr r> ), they require a learning subsidy to learn according to (11).  
Conversely, if they are too eager to learn, they have to be deterred from learning  a learning tax.  We refer to a subsidy 
because it is difficult to motivate the situation where Pr r< , but the model does not exclude the possibility that 
0tσ < .   
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consumers of type ∆  choose the optimal moment of learning ( )T ∆  that minimizes the current 
value of expected total costs by solving the stopping problem  
[ ]
1
0 1
min ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
t
P P P
T
r t r T r t
t T t tT t t T
e e dF F e
τ
τ σ δ δ τ τ
−∆− ∞
− − −
= = + −∞
  + ∆ − + ∆ + + − −∆ 
  
∑ ∑ ∫  (15) 
That is, consumers of type ∆  learn at a given time ( )T ∆  only if the costs of doing so are 
strictly lower than the costs of learning at any other ( )t T≠ ∆  and of never learning at all, in which 
case ( )T ∆ = ∞ .   
We explicitly allow the private discount rate to differ from the social discount rate.  There is a 
large literature on private versus social values, with some authors arguing that they should be equal 
(e.g. Baumol, 1968) and others maintaining that, since investment has a public-good component, it 
should therefore be rewarded by a social discount rate that is below the private one (Weitzman, 
1994).   
The first term in (15) describes the costs before learning, when the consumer uses the dirty 
alternative, which simply consists of paying the tax tτ  in every period up to time 1T − , discounted 
to the present using the interest rate Pr .  The second term reflects the (discounted) expected costs 
of learning at time T , reduced by the first-time user subsidy tσ .  The last term represents costs that 
accrue after the consumer has learned the value of his δ .  The integral represents the expected 
costs of remaining in alternative B, conditional on δ  turning out to be low enough for this to be 
optimal (i.e., tδ τ+ ∆ ≤ ).  Conversely, if the consumer’s private costs turn out to be above this 
threshold, he will revert to the dirty alternative and once again incur the instantaneous costs tτ , 
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possibly switching to the clean alternative again once the tax has increased to a sufficiently high 
level.  This leads us to our second result:   
Proposition 2 
The first-best transition path can be implemented with a usage tax tτ  for the dirty alternative in 
combination with a subsidy for first-time users of tσ .   
Proof:  In order for all agents who have already learned their personal costs to face the same 
incentive to use the clean alternative according to the first-best transition path ( , , )t tt s kθ , the 
regulator needs to set t tτ θ= .  The building of new capacity tk  can directly be controlled.  In order 
to generate the optimal incentives for agents to learn in the respective periods, consumer type t∆  as 
defined in the optimal approach path must be indifferent between learning in period 1t −  and t .  
Considering (15), this is the case if  
[ ]1 1( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
t t
P Pr r
t t t t t t t t te dF F e
τ
σ δ δ τ τ τ σ
−∆
− −
− −
−∞
  ∆ − + ∆ + + − −∆ = + ∆ − 
  
∫     (16) 
It is instructive to generate more insights into the properties of this subsidy path for first-time 
users.  In the Appendix, we show that  
1    and   0   if   P
r
t t t Pe r rσ σ σ
−
−
> > >
= = =
< < <
      (17) 
We can summarize this in the following proposition:  
Proposition 3 
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If social and private discount rates coincide, the first-best solution can be decentralized by taxing 
the dirty alternative.  If the private discount rate is higher (lower) than the social discount rate, the 
first-best solution can be implemented by complementing the tax with a subsidy (tax) for first-time 
users.  The discounted absolute value of this subsidy (tax) is decreasing over time; i.e., 
1
Pr
t t eσ σ
−
− > ⋅ .   
Proposition 3 demonstrates that it is relatively easy to decentralize the first-best solution as 
long as individuals correctly weigh the future costs and benefits attributed to trying the new 
alternative.  The reason is that our model assumes efficient learning.  If, however, the private and 
the social discount rates differ, relying simply on a tax to curb usage of the dirty alternative is not 
sufficient.  If the private discount rate is higher, individuals do not have sufficient incentives to 
learn.  Suboptimal learning on the part of the consumer creates an indirect externality for other 
consumers: As they do not learn and do not use the cleaner alternative B, the marginal social 
damages from the dirty alternative and the associated environmental tax are inefficiently high, 
thereby preventing some consumers from trying the clean alternative even if that were the socially 
optimal choice.  Consumers do not consider this pecuniary externality when solving the optimal 
stopping problem.  Incentives for efficient learning can be established specifically by subsidizing 
the consumer’s first use of the clean alternative where the absolute discounted value of the subsidy 
decreases over time.  The steady state is reached with a strictly positive subsidy which could be 
completely phased out once the steady state is reached, i.e. when no additional consumer learns.  If 
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Pr r< , first-time use needs to be taxed, with the absolute discounted value of the tax strictly 
decreasing over time.15   
Proposition 3 indicates a reason for why regulators may adjust their policies in a dynamic 
setting, by temporarily subsidizing trials of a new alternative: while taxes are increasing over time, 
the subsidy for first-time users decreases.   
Similarly, consumers may have biased expectations in the sense that their perceived 
distribution of costs, ( )F δ , differs from the true distribution such that ( ) ( )F Fδ δ≠ ; i.e., if they 
over- or underestimate their personal costs.  We show in the Appendix that  
1    if   0
r
t t te bσ σ
−
−
> >
= =
< <
         (18) 
with ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t
t t t t tb dF dF
θ θ
θ δ δ θ δ δ
−∆ −∆
−∞ −∞
≡ ∆ − + − ∆ − +∫ ∫      
If one distribution first-order stochastically dominates the other (in the sense that 
( ) ( ) ( )F Fδ δ< >  for all δ , then tb  is always either positive or negative.  We immediately obtain 
the following corollary to Proposition 3:  
                                                 
15 The strict inequality in Eq. (17) implies a nonzero subsidy or tax in the steady state.  For pr r> , the subsidy could 
be reduced to zero once the steady state has been reached without affecting the learning decision (no consumer would 
have an incentive to learn either way).  For pr r< , the steady-state tax has to be kept indefinitely at 
( )( ) / ( 1)p pr rSS r SS SSe e eσ θ= − ∆ − − .    
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Corollary  
If consumers overestimate (underestimate) costs δ such that F  first-order stochastically 
dominates (is first-order stochastically dominated by) F , the first-best solution can be 
implemented by augmenting the tax with a subsidy (tax) for first-time users.  The absolute value of 
the discounted subsidy or tax is decreasing over time, i.e. 1
r
t t eσ σ
−
− > ⋅ .   
To illustrate this point, consider again Figure 2.  If consumers systematically overestimate their 
personal costs of using the clean alternative such that 0tb >  for all t .
16 The change in (11) implies 
an increase in ˆ( )tθ ∆  that is qualitatively similar to an increase of the personal rate of discount, 
leading to a shift in the steady state from SS to SS’.   
A subsidy for first-time users allows the first-best solution to be decentralized, but it may not 
always be a feasible policy.  In the next section, we therefore explore the situation where the 
regulator cannot differentiate between first-time and other users.   
5.  Decentralization with a tax on the dirty alternative only 
We now determine the path for tτ , rendered second-best by imposing 0tσ = .  The tax-path 
( )tTP τ=  leads consumers to choose their optimal moment of learning ( )T ∆  according to (15) and 
                                                 
16 Stutzer et al. (2011) argue that the benefits of some public programs are only fully appreciated upon reflection by 
consumers, which does not take place without some form of stimulus.  This is equivalent to private expectations 
0tb > .   
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thus determines an equation of motion, 1 ( )t t ts TP+ = +∆ ∆ , for the amount of consumers t∆  who 
have learned until a given time t.  The social planner’s problem becomes 
1
( ),( ) 0
1
1
1
0 0 0 0
min ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
s.t. ( )
0; 0
;
t t t
t t
t
rt
t t tTP k t
t t
t t t
t t
t
t
t
t t
e dF dG dG D C Q k
s TP
K K k
K
k
K K
τ
τ
δ δ
τ
+∆ −∆ ∆∞
−
=
= −∞ −∞ ∆
+
+
+
= =
 
⋅ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ∆ + −Ω + Ω + 
 
 
∆ = ∆ +
= +
≥ Ω
≥ ≥
∆ = ∆ =
∑ ∫ ∫ ∫
     (19) 
with  1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
t t t tF dG G Gτ
∆
+−∞
Ω ≡ −∆ ∆ + ∆ − ∆∫      
In order to explore the properties of the second-best regulation path, we start by focusing on 
the learning decision.  It is helpful to define a personal learning threshold by the level of a constant 
tax rate ˆ( )τ ∆  which makes individuals of type ∆  indifferent between learning and never 
learning.17 It is given by  
                                                 
17 The individual is also indifferent between learning at t=0, and at a later time s>0.  To see this, suppose that (20) 
holds.  Moving to a period s>t leads to three changes in the first line: i.) the first term on the LHS has to be multiplied 
by pr te− , ii.) the summation index on the LHS starts at t=s+1, and iii.) the summation index on the RHS starts at t=s.  
However, it is easy to verify that the second line will not change.  If the consumer is indifferent between learning at 
t=0 and never, and between t=s and never, he is also indifferent between learning at t=0 and t=s.   
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ˆ
1 0
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
ˆ ˆ( 1)( ) ( ) ( )
p p
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r t r t
t t
r
dF F e e
e dF
τ
τ
δ δ τ τ τ
τ δ τ δ
−∆∞ ∞
− −
= =−∞
−∆
−∞
  ∆ + ∆ + + − −∆ = 
  
⇔ − −∆ = ∆ + −
∑ ∑∫
∫
    (20) 
In general, however, the tax path is not constant.  Here, the threshold ˆ( )τ ∆  helps to 
characterize the timing of learning that is formulated in the following lemma (proof in Appendix): 
Lemma 
For any given path of usage taxes ( )tTP τ= , individuals of type ∆  may learn in a period t  by 
trying the clean alternative in t  only if (i) ˆ( )tτ τ> ∆  and (ii)  1t tτ τ −> .   
In particular, the lemma implies that agents will not learn along a decreasing portion of the 
taxation path.  Furthermore, agents of type ∆  will never learn if the tax rate never exceeds ˆ( )τ ∆ .  
We use these insights to determine the second-best tax path ( )tTP τ= .  If no more learning takes 
place ( 1t t+∆ = ∆ ), and the capacity is built up sufficiently, the optimization necessarily implies
'(1 ) '( )SS SS SSD Cτ = −Ω − Ω , i.e. ( )SS SSτ θ= ∆  as defined in (13).  That is, the relationship between 
the optimal tax and net marginal damages remains unchanged relative to the first-best outcome.  
Since at a steady state tax rate no uninformed agent can have an incentive to learn, we further 
know that ˆ( )SS SS SSθ τ τ= ≤ ∆ .  We define a private steady state ( , )SS SSp pθ ∆  as the solution of 
ˆ( ) ( )SS SS SSp p pθ τ θ= ∆ = ∆ .  
In the following, we will discuss the implications of differing discount rates for our model.  It 
is clear from Proposition 3 that the first-best path can be obtained using a tax only if Pr r= : In this 
case ˆˆ( ) ( )τ θ∆ = ∆  such that the social steady state ( , )SS SSS Sθ ∆  given by ˆ( ) ( )
SS SS SSθ θ θ= ∆ = ∆ and 
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the private steady state ( , )SS SSp pθ ∆  coincide.  However, the decentralization leads to a different 
learning behavior if Pr r> , in which case we have ˆˆ( ) ( )τ θ∆ > ∆ , which follows immediately from 
comparing the right-hand side of (11) which defines ˆ( )θ ∆  with the definition of ˆ( )τ ∆  in (20).  
Since ( )θ ∆  is decreasing in ∆ , this implies that 
SS SS
S Pθ θ<   and  
SS SS
S P∆ > ∆      (21) 
Intuitively, private impatience makes people hesitant to learn.  In order to induce the same 
consumer type to learn, a higher tax rate is needed, leading to a steady state in which fewer 
consumers are informed, and consequently net marginal damages and the usage tax are higher.   
When relying on the usage tax alone, any increasing tax path in the decentralized setting must 
optimally end up in the steady state ( , )SS SSp pθ ∆ .  However, we show that one can improve upon this 
by using a non-monotonic path.   
Proposition 4 
If the private discount rate pr  exceeds the social discount rate r , a taxation path that is first 
increasing, but will decrease at one point in time before being constant, can improve upon a policy 
that relies on a monotonically increasing tax path.   
We prove this proposition by noting that a steady state requires that no additional learning 
takes place.  Without trying to trigger additional learning, the welfare-maximizing policy for any 
assumed steady state learning rate ∞∆ is given by ( )τ θ∞ ∞= ∆ .  Assuming welfare-maximization 
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by the regulator, no increasing tax path can hence improve upon the permanent steady state 
( , )SS SSp pθ ∆  once the learning rate of 
SS
p∆  has been obtained.
18 
The regulator could, however, temporarily increase the tax to ( )t tτ θ> ∆  in order to induce 
more agents to learn (such that SSp p∆ > ∆ ), before adjusting the tax to a lower level 
( ) SSP P Pτ θ θ= ∆ < .  In the Appendix, we show that this can indeed be welfare-improving with the 
simplest example of a path that involves a tax rate SST Pτ θ>  for only one period before permanently 
being adjusted to a new lower level ( )P Pτ θ= ∆ .   
Proposition 4 thereby complements the result stated in Proposition 3: If the private discount 
rate exceeds the social one, the first-best solution can be implemented by complementing the tax 
with a subsidy for first-time users.  Alternatively, if such a subsidy is infeasible, a taxation path 
which is at first increasing, but which decreases at a future point in time before becoming constant, 
can improve upon a policy that relies on a monotonically increasing tax path.  The intuition is that 
one needs to induce agents to learn their personal net costs by trying the new clean alternative.  If a 
sufficient number of agents have done so, the relative price of the dirty alternative can be reduced.  
Again, the same conclusions apply for biased expectations of costs or benefits.   
                                                 
18 Any announcement of further increasing tax rates to trigger learning beyond SSP∆  would not correspond to a time-
consistent policy, as the regulator would have an incentive to lower the tax rates below ( )SSPθ ∆  once the additional 
learning has occurred. 
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6.  Conclusions 
Regulation often involves introductory taxes or subsidies that may later be reduced.  Usually 
this is motivated by supply-side considerations such as decreasing production costs or technology 
spillovers.  In this article, we discuss a different rationale for introductory subsidies that is 
motivated by the demand-side: If consumers are uncertain about their tastes regarding a new 
technology, they may learn by trying.  A prominent and environmentally relevant example 
involves the introduction of new public transport options.  Whereas consumers usually know the 
total private costs and benefits of their status quo alternative (commuting by car), at least a part of 
the true opportunity costs of using public transport need to be experienced before they can be 
known.   
In this paper, we demonstrate how an optimal regulation should incorporate dynamic features 
that initiate from this “learning-by-trying” in an intertemporal setting.  Any regulation needs to 
simultaneously account for two dimensions: First, experienced consumers will use the new 
technology if their private opportunity costs are outweighed by a tax on the old technology; second, 
the policy in its introductory phase needs to control the optimal number of new consumers.   
We demonstrate that the optimal transition path to a steady state involves increasing regulation 
levels as long as social and private learning incentives coincide.  In this case, the first-best path can 
be decentralized by taxing the dirty alternative.  Along the optimal path, the tax rates are increasing, 
which corresponds to a slow introduction of taxes.  With zero or low fixed costs to expand the 
capacity of the new technology, the fraction of consumers using the clean alternative actually falls 
over time, since initially many consumers try the alternative, but then may (temporarily) go back to 
the polluting option.  If the capacity expansion is costly, both the optimal tax and usage rates 
increase over time.   
28 
The qualitative features of the optimal policy significantly change if the private discount rate 
exceeds the social discount rate.  Due to the divergence between private and social learning 
incentives, a tax on the dirty alternative alone cannot implement the first-best solution, but 
complementing the tax with a subsidy for first-time users can.  This subsidy is (weakly) decreasing 
over time.  If such a special treatment of first-time users is not feasible, the regulator’s second-best 
tax path also needs to take the different learning incentives into account.  A tax path that is first 
increasing, but will decrease at one point in time before being constant, can improve upon a policy 
that relies on a monotonically increasing tax path.   
Although we derive our results in the context of differing private and social discount rates, 
they also apply to situations where consumers have biased expectations about the full costs or 
benefits of a new technology.  Similar to the inefficiencies resulting from the difference between 
private and social discount rates, biased expectations result in socially inefficient learning that has 
to be corrected by means of subsidies or taxes for first-time users in order to obtain the first-best 
solution (where the subsidy is equal to the bias), or by a non-monotonic regulation path if the first-
best solution is not feasible.   
More generally, our results suggest that if private learning incentives lead to a rate of exposure 
to a new experience good that lies below the social optimum, introductory subsidies can be 
justified not only with decreasing production costs, but also when consumers learn by experience.   
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Figure 1: Phase diagram for an interior solution in the first-best policy case 
 
Figure 2: Change of steady state in response to underlying parameters 
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Figure 3: Time paths of the optimal solution 
 
 
                          Fig.  3a: Cost limit         Fig.  3b: State of learning 
 
                      Fig.  3c: Rate of learning            Fig.  3d: Total capacity 
 
                     Fig.  3e:  Rate of expansion               Fig.  3f: Usage rate   
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Appendix 
Derivation of Eqs. (11) and (12) 
For a continuous approach path, (6) will hold with equality during the approach path as well as 
in the steady state.  Solving for 1 1( , )t tJ K∆ + +∆  while using (5) leads to  
1 1
1 1
( , ) ( ) ( )rt t t t t
J K e gθ+ + + +
∂ ∆
= −∆ ∆
∂∆
       (A.1) 
Shifting the equation by one period yields an expression for ( , )t tJ K∆ ∆ .  Substituting the 
shadow price tλ  into (9), canceling terms and dividing by ( )tg ∆ :  
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
r
t t t t t t t te dF F
θ
θ δ δ θ θ θ
−∆
+
−∞
− ∆ = ∆ + − −∆ −∆ +∫     (A.2) 
Including ( )t t tFθ θ −∆  in the integral and solving for 1( )
r
t te θ θ −−  leads to (11).  Now we 
solve (7) for 1 1( , )K t tJ K+ +∆ :  
1 1( , ) ( )rt t t t
J K e Q
K
λ+ +
∂ ∆ ′= −
∂
  .      (A.3) 
Deriving ( , )K t tJ K∆  and substituting both into (10) and rearranging and shifting time period 
one forward leads to (12).   
Derivation of Eqs. (13) and (14) 
Setting 0ts =  and holding tλ  constant in Eq. (5) gives  
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   (A.4) 
Totally differentiating and rearranging shows that the relationship ( )tθ ∆  is decreasing:   
0; 0;
0; 0;
t t t t
t t t t
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          (13) 
The relationship is negative due to our assumption that 0tD′′>  and 0tC ′′ > .  Next, setting 
1t tθ θ −=  in (11) and solving for tθ  leads to  
1
1 ( ) ( )
1
t t
t t
t t t tr dFe
θ
θ θ
θ θ δ δ
−
−∆
=
−∞
= ∆ + −∆ −
− ∫       (A.5) 
Totally differentiating and rearranging gives:  
1 1
1
/ˆ 1 ( )( ) 1
1 / 1 ( )
t t
t t t t
t t
t t
r
t t tt
r
t t t t
d e dFd
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θ
θ θ θ θ
θ
θ θ
θ θ δθ
θ θ δ
− −
−
−∆
= = −∞
−∆
=
−∞
∂ ∂∆ − −∆
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∫
     (14) 
Derivation of Eqs. (17) and (18) 
Rearranging (16) leads to  
35 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
P Pr r
t t t t t t t te e dF
τ
σ σ τ τ δ τ δ
−∆
− −
−∞
− = ∆ − + −∆ + ∆ + −∫     (A.6) 
Eq. (11) can be rearranged to   
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
t t
r
t t t t t te dF
θ
θ θ δ θ δ
−∆
−
−∞
∆ − + −∆ + ∆ + − =∫      (A.7) 
When substituting t tθ τ= , the RHS in (A.6) is identical to the LHS in (A.7) except for the 
interest rate.  Combining (A.6) and (A.7) yields 
1 1( )( )P P
r r r
t t t te e eσ σ θ− −− = − ∆ −         (A.8) 
Note that (A.1) when shifted by one period implies that 1 0t tθ −∆ − >  as ( , ) 0t tJ K∆ ∆ <  during 
the approach path, as the presence of more informed consumers strictly lowers the social costs if 
additional learning is still optimal.  Note further that (11) implies for an interior steady state that  
( )1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
SS SS
r SS SS SS SSe F dF
θ
θ θ δ δ
−∆
−∞
− + −∆ ∆ − + =∫        
which necessarily implies 0SS SSθ∆ − >  as the left hand-side is negative at 0SS SSθ∆ − =  and 
increasing in SS SSθ∆ − .19  Eq. (A.8) therefore implies that 1 P
r
t teσ σ− −  has the same sign as 
                                                 
19 Intuitively, ( , ) 0J K∆ ∞ ∞∆ <  (and therefore 0θ∞ ∞∆ − >  by (A.1)) follows because there will always exist some 
consumers with δ θ∞ ∞< −∆  such that the social value of learning is strictly positive even in the steady state.   
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Pr re e−  during the approach path and in the steady state.  Eq. (A.8) further implies that the steady 
state subsidy SSσ  which induces type SS∆  to learn is given by ( )( ) / ( 1)p pr rSS r SS SSe e eσ θ= − ∆ − − . 
For Pr r>  it follows that 0
SSσ > , and that the subsidy is positive along the whole approach path 
since 1 P
r
t teσ σ− > .  Note that after type 
SS∆  has learned, the subsidy for first-time users could be 
reduced to zero, although this will have no effect on learning.  For Pr r< , the subsidy is negative 
both in the steady state and along the approach path, i.e. it turns into a tax.  For Pr r=  neither 
subsidy nor tax are required.   
To derive (18), we assume that consumers use the socially optimal discount rate, but that they 
have biased expectations in the sense that their perceived pdf for δ  differs from the true pdf such 
that ( ) ( )F Fδ δ≠ .  Defining consumers’ bias as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t
t t t t tb dF dF
θ θ
θ δ δ θ δ δ
−∆ −∆
−∞ −∞
≡ ∆ − + − ∆ − +∫ ∫ ,     (A.9) 
the individual learning condition that corresponds to (A.6) becomes (setting Pr r= , and replacing 
( )F δ  by ( )F δ ): 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
r r
t t t t t t t t te e dF b
τ
σ σ τ τ δ τ δ
−∆
− −
−∞
− = ∆ − + −∆ + ∆ + − +∫    (A.10) 
Substituting t tθ τ=  and using (A.7) we obtain (18).   
Proof of the Lemma 
(i) The proof requires two steps (i.1) and (i.2).   
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(i.1)  Assume that ˆ( )tτ τ≤ ∆  and that tax rates ˆ( )sτ τ≤ ∆  for all future periods s t> .  Then 
learning at t generates weakly larger costs than never learning and is therefore not optimal.  This is 
seen from the definition of ˆ( )τ ∆  in (20) which implies: 
( ) ( )
1
( )
1
( )
ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ( )
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
( ) ( )
( ( ) () )
s
p p
s
p
p
r s t r s t
s s s
s t s t
r s t
t s
s t
r s t
s t
dF F e e
dF e
dF e
τ
τ
τ
δ δ τ τ τ
τ δ τ δ
τ δ δτ
−∆∞ ∞
− − − −
= + =−∞
−∆∞
− −
= + −∞
−∆
− −
= + −∞
∆
     ∆ + ∆ + + − −∆ −    
     
  = ∆ − + ∆ + − 
  
  ≥ ∆ − + ∆ + − 
 
∆

∆
∑ ∑∫
∑ ∫
∫
1
0
∞
=
∑
    
(i.2).  Part (i.1) immediately implies that learning in t can only be optimal if ˆ( )tτ τ> ∆  or 
ˆ( )sτ τ> ∆  for some periods s t> .  To complete proving (i), we need to show that ˆ( )tτ τ> ∆  is 
indeed necessary.  To see this, assume that learning is optimal in t with  ˆ( )tτ τ≤ ∆  and define T  as 
the first period in which T tτ τ> , i.e. s tτ τ≤  for all t s T≤ < .  Note that (i.1) implies that T t>  
holds.  We show that costs from learning in t  are strictly higher than learning in T , implying that 
learning in t cannot be optimal:  
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1
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
( ) (
1
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ))
s
p p p
s T
p p
T T
r s t r s t r T t
s s t s
s t s t
T
r s t r T t
t s T T
s t
dF F e e e
dF e dF e
τ
τ τ
δ δ τ τ τ τ
τ δ τ δ δ τ δ τ
−∆ −
− − − − − −
= + = +−∞
−∆ −∆−
− − − −
= + −∞ −∞
     ∆ + ∆ + + − −∆ − + + ∆    
     
  = ∆ − + ∆ + − + ∆ + − − ∆ − 
  
∑ ∑∫
∑ ∫ ∫
[ ]
[ ]
)
1
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ))
( )(1 ) ( ) ( )
1 ( 1)
1 ( 1
t t
p p
t
p p
p p p
p
T
r s t r T t
t t t t
s t
T
r T t r s t
t t
s t
T
r r s t r T t
t
s t
r
t
dF e dF e
e dF e
e e e
e
τ τ
τ
τ δ τ δ δ τ δ τ
τ δ τ δ
τ
τ
−∆ −∆−
− − − −
= +−∞ −∞
−∆
− − − −
= +−∞
− − − −
= +
> ∆ − + ∆ + − + ∆ + − − ∆ −
= ∆ − − + ∆ + −
 
≥ ∆ − − − − 
 
= ∆ − − −
∑∫ ∫
∑∫
∑
( )
( )1)
1
0
p
p p
p
r T t
r r T t
r
ee e
e
− −
− − −
−
 −
− 
− 
=
   (A.11) 
Results (i.1) and (i.2) together prove claim (i) of Lemma.   
(ii) Part (ii) of Lemma can now be easily seen: Assume that learning in t is optimal.  Then, part 
(i) implies ˆ( )tτ τ> ∆ .  To show that 1t tτ τ −> , we compare the costs of learning in t with those of 
learning in in period t-1.  Learning in t leads to lower costs than learning in t-1 if and only if  
1
1
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
( ) ( 1)( ) ( ) ( )
t
p p
t
p p
r r
t t t
r r
t t t t
e dF F e
e e dF
τ
τ
δ δ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ δ δ
−∆
− −
−
−∞
−∆
−
−∞
  ∆ + ∆ + + − −∆ > + ∆ 
  
⇔ − > − −∆ + −∆ −
∫
∫
    (A.12) 
Here, the right-hand side of the last inequality increases in tτ  and evaluates to zero in 
ˆ( )tτ τ= ∆ .  Therefore it is greater than zero for ˆ( )tτ τ> ∆  which implies 1t tτ τ −>  and thereby 
completes the proof.     
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Proof of Proposition 4 
We assume that the current SST P∆ = ∆ .  In order to induce a marginal P∆ -type consumer to 
learn by just increasing the tax rate for one period before reducing it to ( )Pθ ∆  in such a setting, the 
tax rate Tτ  needs to satisfy the following learning condition:   
( )
( ) ( ) (1 ( ( ) )) ( ) ( )
1  1  
P PP P
P P
r r
P P P P P T Pr r
e edF F
e e
θ
δ δ θ θ τ θ
∆ −∆− −
− −
−∞
  ∆ + ∆ + + − ∆ −∆ ∆ = + ∆ 
− −  
∫

       (A.13) 
which can be solved for  
( )
( ) ( ( )) ( )
1  
P PP
P
r
T T P P P Pr
e dF
e
θ
τ τ δ θ δ
∆ −∆−
−
−∞
  = ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ 
−   
∫

     (A.14) 
The social costs from this path are given by: 
( )
( )
Cost( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ] [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ] [ ] (A.15)
1
SS
P T P P
SS
P
P P
P T T T T
r
P Pr
dF dG dG D C Q K
e dF dG D C
e
τ
θ
δ δ
δ δ
∆ ∆ −∆ ∆
−∞ −∞ ∆
∆ ∆ −∆−
−
−∞ −∞
 
 ∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ∆ + −Ω + Ω + Ω −
 
 
 
 + ∆ + ∆ + −Ω + Ω
 −  
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫

 
 
      with      
( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ) ( )
SS
P
P
SS
T T P P P
P P
F dG G G
F dG
τ
θ
∆
−∞
∆
−∞
Ω = ∆ −∆ ∆ + ∆ − ∆
Ω = ∆ −∆ ∆
∫
∫ 
    (A.16) 
It is sufficient to show that cost ( ) 0SSP′ ∆ < .  Noting that ( ) ( )
SS
P T P Pθ τ θ= ∆ = ∆  in 
SS
P P∆ = ∆ , we 
obtain: 
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( )
( )
( )
Cost'( ) / ( )
( '(1 ) '( ))
( ) ( ) ( ( ) )( '(1 ) '( ))
1
( ) ( ( ))
1
SS
P
SS SS
P P
SS
P
SS SS
P P
SS
P T T
r
SS SS SS
P P P P Pr
r
SS SS SS SS
P P P Pr
g
D C
e dF F D C
e
e
e
θ
θ
θ
δ δ θ
θ δ θ
= ∆
∆ −∆−
−
−∞ = ∆
−
−
∆ ∆
= ∆ − −Ω − Ω
 
 + ∆ + − ∆ −∆ −Ω − Ω 
−   
= ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + − ∆
−
∫






 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ( )) ( )
1
0
SS SS
P P
SS SS
P PP
P
r
SS SS SS SS
P P P Pr
dF
e dF
e
θ
θ
δ
θ δ θ δ
∆ −∆
−∞
∆ −∆−
−
−∞
  
 
  
  < ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ 
−   
=
∫
∫


 
 (A.17) 
where the last inequality follows from the assumed relationship between private and social 
discount rates Pr r> .  The last equality follows from the learning condition in the private steady 
state.   
